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This paper brings back the fiscal angle to the analysis 
of equal opportunities both by connecting traditional 
benefit-incidence analysis of public spending with 
equal opportunities and by conducting ex-ante micro-
simulations on the fiscal cost of equal opportunity 
policies in education. Four simulations are conducted 
in Liberia, a country devastated by a civil war, with 
serious educational enrollment gaps and fiscal policies 
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highly dependent on international aid. Results for the 
simulated policy scenarios (increases in teachers’ salaries, 
elimination of both fee and non-fee costs borne by 
households, and targeting public spending on education 
to rural schools) point to very modest redistributive 
effects but very different patterns of winners and losers 
among groups of children in Liberia.  
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Equality of Opportunities, Redistribution and Fiscal Policy: The Case of Liberia 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Political and economic thinking remains divided about the extent to which fiscal policies should 
be used to redress inequality. An early review in Barr (1987) shows how libertarians, liberals, 
socialists, Marxists and other collectivist views differ on the role that the state should play in 
reducing social and economic inequalities. Most recently, John Roemer‘s ―Equality of 
Opportunities‖ consolidates the increasing discontent among egalitarian political philosophers on 
what they consider excessive attention given to the state‘s role to the detriment of personal 
responsibilities and the focus on outcomes—monetary incomes, for the most part—in the 
understanding of inequality. Under this view, inequality of outcomes due to differential effort is 
ethically acceptable, while that caused by circumstances beyond the control of individuals or that 
society accepts that individuals should not be responsible for is ethically unacceptable (Roemer 
et al. 2003: 540). It is only for the latter inequity that the state has ethical grounds to intervene 
and for fiscal policies to redress the situation.  
 
Early work on equality of opportunities (Roemer 1998, Betts and Roemer 2001, Page and 
Roemer 2001, Roemer et al. 2003) primarily focused on this fiscal side. Those analyses 
invariably included a fiscal policy tool, be it educational financing (Betts and Roemer 2001), 
taxation and transfers (Roemer et al. 2003) or unemployment insurance (Roemer 1998), and they 
asked fundamentally fiscal questions. For example, in Betts and Roemer (2001), the authors 
examine the extent to which redirecting educational public spending would contribute to narrow 3 
 
educational access across races in the US. More recent work has shifted the attention to the 
measurement of unequal opportunities—either constructing stochastic dominance tests or new 
indexes, such as the Human Opportunity Index. Also, empirical work has started to include 
developing countries.
2 Analytical changes have included the expansion of circumstances from 
race and parental education to additional variables to account for social background and 
household demographics and to include children rather than (male) adults.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to bring back the fiscal policy angle to the measurement and analysis 
of equality of opportunities. In doing so, this paper conducts two separate exercises. First, it 
expands one of the most used distributive analyses of fiscal policies, benefit-incidence analysis 
(BIA), and relates it to the concept of equality of opportunities. Second, it carries out ex-ante 
micro-simulations of alternative fiscal policies and estimates their impacts on the distribution of 
educational opportunities for children in Liberia. Liberia is a case worth exploring for multiple 
reasons: a protracted civil war between 1989 and 2004 that devastated the country and shattered 
vulnerable groups, including children; a delicate fiscal position dependent on the vagaries of 
international aid; and only a few distributive analyses despite the existence of socioeconomic and 
fiscal data.  
 
The present work differs from previous literature on equality of opportunity in that we do not 
control for effort (more precisely, we do not simplistically claim that effort is a residual of one or 
two selected circumstances), but rather focuses entirely on the role that multiple circumstances 
                                                           
2 Cogneau  and Mesplé-Somps (2009)  analyze  inequality  of  opportunities  for  incomes in  Sub-Saharan  Africa;  Bourguignon, 
Ferreira and Melendez (2007) and Molinas et al. (2010) cover Latin American countries. 4 
 
play in generating unequal access to education among children, who cannot be accountable for 
effort differences. Also, the analysis integrates fiscal policies as a de facto circumstance, that is, 
a decision that individuals have nothing to do with and cannot be responsible for and which most 
observers would agree should not matter for the legal right of children to access schools.  
 
Results show that circumstances play a dramatic role in educational disparities among Liberian 
children, especially parental education, but also gender, orphanhood, birth order, location and 
exposure to conflict. Results indicate that that average impact on opportunities from substantial 
relative increases in spending may be limited. The exercise in this paper is not a behavioral 
simulation, however, but rather a model that sheds light on the relevance of several constraints 
acting against a leveled field of equal opportunities. Results strongly indicate that the average 
impact on opportunities from substantial relative changes in spending may be limited. This is 
primarily due to the meager public budget on education. At the same time, opportunity impacts 
are not equally distributed among types of children, implying different patterns of winners and 
losers caused by interventions aimed at improving equal opportunities among children.   
 
2.  The Distributive Analysis of Fiscal Policies within the Equality of Opportunity 
Approach 
2.1. The Analysis of Equality of Opportunity 
Although the empirical literature on equality of opportunities is relatively recent, it has already 
branched out in several directions (Appendix 1). Works can be classified into one of two 5 
 
categories: (i) normative studies with a clear policy objective, using either parametric or non-
parametric empirical analyses on the impact of circumstances on some specific wellbeing 
objective; and (ii) measuring the extent of equality of opportunities in a given country or region 
as part of a diagnostic approach. Also, studies differ in analyzing just one or two or multiple 
circumstances and opportunities. 
 
Roemer (1998) is the seminal reference. His framework comprises five concepts (Roemer et al. 
2003). Objective is the goal that equal opportunities are expected to achieve. Circumstances are 
the attributes of an individual‘s environment (either social, genetic or biological) that affect the 
achievement of the objective but that are beyond the control of the individual and for which 
society does not regard him or her responsible. Effort refers to individual behaviors and decisions 
that, together with circumstances, determine the level of objective accomplished. Instrument 
refers to the policy—typically the provision of resources—used to equalize opportunities. Type is 
a set of individuals who all have the same circumstances. Equality of opportunities prevails when 
an objective or outcome is achieved with the same level of effort across different circumstances. 
Analytically, Roemer‘s work seeks the value of the instrument that equalizes the value of the 
objective across types at any given degree of effort (Roemer et al. 2003, 542). Empirical 
applications of this approach are found in Betts and Roemer (2001), Roemer et al. (2003),  
 
A second empirical approach is developed in Van der Gaer (1993), Ooghe et al. (2007), Hild and 
Voorhoeve (2004) and Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps (2009). It considers that there is equality of 
opportunities when the distribution of expected earnings is independent of social origins. 6 
 
Conditional expectations of earnings (or consumption as in Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps, 2009) 
are obtained from the distribution of average income estimated across several categories. These 
categories are typically determined by parental education and/or parental occupation and, in 
some cases, geographical location. Some versions of this approach, as in Cogneau and Mesplé-
Somps (2009) or Cogneau and Cigneux (2008), use ‗intermediary‘ variables to analyze the link 
between social origin and income/consumption (such as social position and education). They 
conclude that a significant part of difference in inequality of opportunity for 
income/consumption can be attributed to differences in intergenerational mobility linking 
parental education and occupation with sons‘ education and occupation.  
 
A third analytical approach develops non-parametric statistical tests, in particular, stochastic 
dominance tests. Leblanc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008) define equality of opportunity as the 
situation where income distribution conditional on social origin cannot be ranked according to 
stochastic dominance criteria, using non-parametric statistical tests developed by Davidson and 
Duclos (2000) to compare generalized Lorenz curves. Again, social origin is defined by parental 
education and/or occupation. Leblanc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008) distinguish a risk component 
and a return component inspired in the original Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of wage gaps in 
endowment and return differentials: the former assumes that within-type inequality is fully 
erased; the latter assumes that between-type inequality is removed. In addition, the paper 
develops the Gini Opportunity index, which computes the weighted sum of all the differences 
among areas of opportunity sets and then divided that sum by the mean income of the entire 
population. That makes the index independent of the wealth of a society, a convenient feature for 
international country comparison.  7 
 
 
A final approach estimates the Human Opportunity Index (HOI) developed by World Bank 
authors Barros, Ferreira, Molinas and Saavedra (2009) and Molinas et al. (2010). The HOI has 
the clear analytical objective of measuring how equitably a society progresses towards universal 
access of basic opportunities. The index synthesizes in a single indicator how close a society is to 
universal coverage in a given opportunity (as with standard coverage measurements), along with 
how equitably coverage of that opportunity is distributed. Opportunities are goods and services 
that constitute investments in children, thus increasing their human capital, such as primary 
education and adequate housing infrastructure. An equitable policy
3 ensures that a child‘s chance 
of accessing these key goods and services is not correlated with circumstances that are beyond 
their control, such as gender, parental background or ethnicity. The HOI ‗penalizes‘ the extent to 
which different circumstance groups (types in Roemer‘s terminology) have different coverage 
rates: the penalty is zero if coverage rates among multiple circumstance groups are equal and is 
positive and increasing as differences in coverage among circumstance groups increase. The HOI 
is equality-sensitive and Pareto-consistent. When access to an opportunity increases equally for 
all circumstance groups, the index increases proportionally. Changes in the HOI over time can be 
decomposed into changes in the distribution of circumstances in the population (composition 
effect), changes in coverage rates for all groups (scale effect), and changes in the degree of 
inequality of opportunity (equalization effect). 
 
 
                                                           
3 Molinas  et  al.  (2010)  note  that  increasing  opportunities  requires  not  only  increasing  access  to  goods  and  services  but, 
sometimes, may also come from civil rights or migration rights, for instance.  8 
 
2.2. The Analytical Limitations of Equality of Opportunities 
There are a number of limitations associated with the analysis of equality of opportunities. First 
and foremost, the conceptual distinction between circumstance and effort has not been 
operationalized in practice with similar clarity. Effort has either been assumed to be a residual of 
circumstances; to be the same within groups of individuals (typically defined by their level of 
earnings); or has been surpassed by restricting the focus of analysis to individuals who cannot be 
accountable for effort differences, that is, children. A result of this is the uncomfortable solution 
of luck being considered part of effort, as explicitly admitted by Roemer et al. (2003). 
Interpretations are even more troublesome when, for example, gender or race become effort 
variables, as they are deemed residuals of socioeconomic background captured solely by parental 
education or occupation.  
 
A second limitation is the arbitrary selection of some key concepts. The distinction between 
circumstance and opportunity is not always sharp. Family income is typically considered a 
circumstance, but it also constitutes an opportunity—inasmuch as it contributes to the access of 
basic services––for the success in life of a child. Disability is clearly considered as a 
circumstance for a child, but having an able, healthy status is considered to be an opportunity for 
future success (or current success in school). Being exposed to or the victim of insecurity may be 
considered equally as a circumstance (in the same way as urban or rural residence) but also as a 
lack of opportunity for children (when considering the potential effects on the physical and 
emotional development of the child).  9 
 
Furthermore, what is ethically acceptable or desirable is conveniently made dependent on any 
society‘s judgment. Thus, if a society considers that females should not be educated equally as 
males, then gender will not be incorporated as a circumstance in the analysis. And different 
judgments may appear frequently across different contexts, be it for religious reasons or in 
contexts of conflict and historical grievances among groups. This, ultimately, creates a sort of 
―quicksand‖ baseline since few circumstances may be universally agreed upon. As a result, 
comparability across countries may be troublesome.  
 
Another limitation refers to the empirical application of measurements. Equality of opportunities 
in a given context is sensitive to the selection of peoples and objectives, as with any other social 
indicator (say, access coverage). However, the HOI is also sensitive to the set of circumstances 
selected as well as the set of opportunities considered. Nonetheless, Narayan and Hoyos‘s 
(forthcoming) results for almost 20 Sub-Saharan African countries substantiate that results tend 
to be robust to changes in definitions. In a similar vein, quality issues are hardly included in the 
analysis, both because it is an open-ended conceptual issue (whether an opportunity is simply 
access to a service or, rather, access to a quality service) but also because datasets typically lack 
the information to systematically include quality considerations.    
 
From a policy point of view, equality of opportunities does not address the causes or motivations 
behind the distributive features of a policy. Rather, analyses have so far concentrated on 
determining how the distribution of an opportunity or objective (say, income or education 
attainment) changes after a policy is introduced in a rather static partial equilibrium set-up. How 10 
 
a policy affects intergenerational mobility within society is hardly estimated, although links 
between the two concepts have been explicitly pointed out (see Bourguignon, Ferreira and 
Menendez 2007 and references there). In addition, the depiction of policymaking so far has been 
very simplistic, assuming for instance that taxation is modified to simplify tax rules—that is, a 
flat rate is imposed to every type—or a similar increase in education spending for all children 
across groups. In other words, the notion of fiscally feasible—affordability—has dominated the 
analysis of more realistic, complex and multidimensional policies. As for the HOI, no application 
to policymaking has been attempted so far, with efforts mainly directed to estimating and 
comparing a set of comparable objectives across countries. The rest of this paper remedies this 
gap by developing a methodology that links HOI with public spending.   
 
3.  Fiscal Issues and Equality of Opportunities: Methodology 
Methodologically, the paper carries out three separate exercises (Appendix 2). First, it estimates 
the HOI for access to education in Liberia for children aged 6-15. HOI is estimated in the World 
Bank ―tradition‖ described above and recently applied to Latin America by Molinas et al. (2010). 
The set of circumstances relevant for Liberia and the selected opportunity are defined and 
justified in section 4, below. 
 
Second, the paper expands the traditional benefit incidence analysis into an ―Opportunity Benefit 
Impact Analysis‖ (Opp-BIA), that is, an incidence analysis of public educational spending along 
the distribution of opportunities, and compares it with the ―traditional‖ BIA based on income 
distribution. Table 2 describes the steps for the analysis, which basically consists of conducting 11 
 
the traditional BIA analysis over a distribution of children (age 6-15) educational opportunities, 
proxied by the expected probability of access to school conditioned on their circumstances.  
 
The Opp-BIA has two main advantages over the traditional BIA. First, it allows focusing on the 
allocation of public resources in education against a concept of vulnerability directly related to 
education, and not around an indirect concept of per capita household income or consumption as 
done by BIA. In other words, it allows a sharper picture of the distribution of resources and 
opportunities directly associated to such resources. Second, it provides insights on how multiple 
factors (all those considered relevant circumstances) affect the distribution of educational 
resources. This is not to say that the analysis determines causality between circumstances and 
educational benefits (in the same way that a traditional BIA does not establish causality between 
household incomes and education spending), but it certainly complements the insights provided 
by the traditional BIA based on household per capita income.  
 
Third, the paper conducts an ex-ante simulation analysis of fiscal implications of redistributive 
interventions aimed at improving the HOI profile in Liberia. In particular, the exercise simulates 
the distributional consequences of re-assigning public expenditures across different circumstance 
groups. Also, it examines the consequences of budgetary increases to improve opportunities for 
all, regardless of circumstance. Critical for this exercise is the inclusion of public spending on 
education as an ad hoc circumstance for children. Thus fiscal policy acts as both an instrument 
for improving equality of opportunities as well as an exogenous circumstance to households. 
This is compatible with the HOI. Molinas et al. (2010) acknowledge that, in specific contexts, 12 
 
policies and circumstances may become the same; even modifying the distribution of 
circumstances can itself become a policy.  
 
The steps involved in this simulation exercise for Liberia are as follows: 
 
Step 1: Computing Opportunities with Spending as Circumstance. Estimate a logit 
model whose dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the child age 6-15 attends 
public school; independent variables include potentially relevant circumstances (for which 
information is available): child‘s gender; household head‘s gender, education and age; region 
of the household; urban or rural nature of the community where the household is located; 
number of elderly in the household; single parent, mother alive and father alive. In addition 
to these circumstances, gross unitary public spending on education, ―S‖ is also included in 
the logit specification. Gross unitary public spending refers to the average benefit that a child 
receives from the government because he or she attends school. This benefit may be in the 
form of cash transfers, school vouchers, free materials or meals and the implicit cost per 
student of public education provision. In the case of Liberia, this benefit includes only the 
implicit average cost of education, as no other programs are currently available.  
 
 
where Ti=1 indicates whether or not the group ―i‖ of children attends school or not and Xj are 
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A new distribution of probabilities of attending school is estimated across children with 
different sets of circumstances and public spending benefits: 
 
 
Appendix 3 below reports the results of the estimated logit.  
 
Step 2: Policy Shock. Once the parameters of each circumstance determining the 
opportunity of attending school are estimated, changes or ―shocks‖ to the distribution of 
public spending on education are introduced: S
sim. These changes consist of increasing or 
decreasing the gross unitary public transfer implicit in public education provision and/or 
changes in the distribution of benefits based on different qualifying conditions, such as age, 
gender or location. The critical—and strong—assumption is that increasing public spending 
will not lead to increases in the private contribution necessary to attend public schools—
neither for those children already enrolled nor for new children not previously attending 
school who will now attend as a result of the new policy—at least in the short run. A second 
critical assumption is that there are no economy-wide or inter-sectoral effects. Increasing 
spending on education may, for example, mean building more schools in rural areas, and 
hence the parameter associated with location may change as a result. Such interactions are 
ruled out in the exercise, which merely implies a monetized transfer to beneficiaries. Four 
policy shocks are considered in this paper: from a purely ‗redistributive‘ scenario in which 
public resources are taken away from certain groups and transferred to other more vulnerable 
^
) 1 (  i T P14 
 
groups (at an assumed zero cost) to scenarios involving a net fiscal cost from removing de 
facto school fees, reducing non-fee costs or increasing teacher salaries. 
 
 
The resulting new estimated probabilities from this step are: 
 
 
Step 3: Attribution. The difference in the estimated HOIs in step 2 and in step 1 is the 
impact attributed to the policy shock. The critical assumption in this case is that no household 
behavioral changes result from the policy change. In other words, the simulation is a pure 
demand shock that allows no behavioral change. This follows the tradition of static BIA 




A few considerations are in order. Endogeneity between public spending and education 
enrolment rates is a potential issue. While this is certainly possible (and even desirable from a 
policy point of view) at a macro or aggregate level, it is not obvious from a household‘s 
perspective. Endogeneity at this level would imply that public policy decisions would be affected 
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A second consideration is the double nature of public spending as a policy tool and as a 
circumstance. There are three arguments supporting this decision. First, as indicated above, 
public spending levels and its composition are exogenous to a particular household condition. 
Households are assumed not to vote with their feet, so to speak, choosing different levels of 
spending across regions. This would not be a realistic proposition in Liberia, at least not on 
education considerations. Second, one would argue that the level and composition of spending 
that an administration decides should not compromise the right of Liberian children to receive 
education. Third, this case is no different from other less clear-cut candidates for circumstance, 
as shown in section 2, where the distinction between circumstance and opportunity is not so clear 
(say, household level of income or consumption).   
 
4.  Data 
4.1. Educational Opportunities in Liberia 
The education system in Liberia is composed of primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. Pre-
primary education covers three years, followed by six years of primary education (grades 1 to 6). 
Secondary education consists of three years of junior secondary high school, followed by three 
years of senior secondary high school. Numerous private sector, community-based, faith-based, 
and concession-sponsored organizations provide education and training services alongside 
government educational institutions (World Bank 2008). 16 
 
Since 2005/06 spending on education has increased in Liberia, a result of the government‘s 
raising public spending and increases in education financing by international donors, rather than 
an increasing prioritization in the sector (World Bank 2010). At 2.9% of GDP in 2007/8, public 
spending on education in Liberia is lower than in other conflict countries in the region and well 
below the share of public spending in Sub-Saharan Africa (13% vs. 20% of public spending, 
respectively). The contribution of households to finance education is very substantive. World 
Bank (2010) reports that in 2007/8 total resources in the public education system of US$ 77.2 
million, accruing from the government --US$12.2 million–– were only half those provided by 
households -- US$27 million –– (and the US$38 million by international donors). 
 
In 2002, the Education Law made primary education free and compulsory, although user fees are 
still reported at a large scale. Enrolment in primary and secondary levels have increased since the 
end of war, but the country is still far from universal primary education and there are clear 
gender, regional and income disparities in access to education (World Bank 2008). 
 
In this context, two issues are relevant when selecting indicators for education that can be 
considered ―opportunities‖. First, indicators must be available from existing data sources and can 
be consistently collected over time in order to conduct inter-temporal comparisons. There are 
two potential data sources, the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for 1986 and 2007 and 
the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) for 2007 and 2010.  Given that the DHS of 
1986 differs significantly from later DHS surveys and that CWIQ provides more recent 
information, the HOI analysis for Liberia is conducted using CWIQ. Also CWIQ data matches 17 
 
the school attendance computed by the Liberian Census 2008 better than DHS data. The CWIQ 
(2007) draws from a sample of 3,600 randomly selected households located in 300 randomly 
selected clusters. Table 1 below presents preliminary results of the incidence/coverage rate of 
opportunities in Liberia for 2007 and 2010.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The second relevant consideration in the selection of opportunities refers to coverage. Table 1 
shows that a number of indicators previously used in Latin American analyses may not be useful 
in the Liberian context, as late entry into school appears to be common due to the lingering 
effects of conflict. Late entry and frequent interruptions also affect timely completion of 6
th 
grade, thus questioning the relevance of timely entrance and/or graduation as an indicator to 
analyze equality of opportunities. In lieu of that, the proposed indicator for the HOI analysis of 
educational opportunities is the proportion children of age 6-15 who attend school.   
 
4.2. Relevant Circumstances in Liberia 
Even when a list of universally accepted circumstances is elusive, circumstances such as gender, 
parents‘ education, incomes and location are widely considered conditions that should not affect 
access to key public services. Historical conditions in Liberia justify analyzing inequality along 
other dimensions as well. Ethnicity (or a proxy for that) can be a relevant circumstance in this 
multi-ethnic country. Given the recent devastating conflict, whether a child has a missing parent 18 
 
and whether s/he belongs to a household that was displaced by the conflict may turn out a 
relevant circumstance as well. With these considerations in mind, the following list of 
circumstances are used for HOI analysis: (1) urban or rural residence; (2) region (six in number); 
and (3) economic status (proxied by asset index) of the household; (4) gender of the child; (5) 
gender and age of household head; (6) education of household head (number of schooling years); 
(7) parental presence in the household; (8) number of children in the household, and presence of 
elderly; (9) exposure to the conflict.
4 Table 2 below reports the basic descriptive statistics for 
these circumstances.  
 
All these circumstances are available from both CWIQ of 2007 and 2010, except for urban/rural 
and regions, which are not reported in the CWIQ 2010. Since direct information on ethnicity is 
not available from CWIQ 2007, region may be considered a reasonable proxy for ethnic 
differences.
5 The circumstances associated with the impacts of conflict are quite prevalent: 
around 30 percent of children do not have both parents and 82 percent are from households that 
were displaced by war in the 1990s. Several possible circumstances relating parental presence in 
the household can be analyzed. One possibility is that both parents are alive and living in the 
household; others include one parent absent from the household, either alive or dead, or both 
parent absent from the household, either alive or dead. As the effect on opportunities of parental 
absence may differ from, say, a living father sending remittances home vis-à-vis a dead mother, 
the most encompassing option is to analyze several circumstances and determine ex-post which 
                                                           
4 Similarly, a child‘s birth order may affect decisions on his or her education, as it is shown to do in terms of consumption 
decisions, school attendance and distribution of chores at home, for instance. However, no CWIQ reports this information. We 
use age as a proxy for birth order. Age is also a relevant circumstance, given that late entry in school is a common phenomenon 
in Liberia. 
5 Liberia has several ethnic groups. The population is divided in Kpelle 20 percent, Bassa 14 percent, Gio 8 percent, Kru 6 
percent and 52 percent spread over 12 other ethnic groups. Kpelle in central and western Liberia is the largest ethnic group. 
Grebo and Kru are concentrated in the southern area, Bassa in the Grand Bassa area, and smaller groups such as Loma and 
Gbandi in Lofa. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/maps.htm.  19 
 
is the most determining and influential one.  Interestingly, some 74 percent of households with 
single parents are led by women.  Only 10 percent of single-parent households have a child with 
a father not alive. That would point to single motherhood rather than orphanhood as the primary 
cause for parental absence.   
 
Selected circumstances (as well as opportunities) must be congruently defined over time, that is, 
for the CWIQ 2007 and 2010. As the computation of HOI requires estimating a logistic model as 
a function of circumstances, changes in the definitions of circumstances or in the list of 
circumstances used over time may affect HOI measurement. The variables reported in Table 2 
are confirmed to have comparable questions in both rounds. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5.  Results  
5.1 HOI School Attendance in Liberia 
The estimation of the 2007 HOI for school attendance among children 6-15 is 59.5 percent, four 
percentage points below the observed coverage rate of 63.5 percent, a difference that is 
statistically significant -- as shown in Figure 1. These two values remained largely unchanged for 
both the HOI and observed coverage rate in 2010 (60.3 percent and 65.3 percent, respectively).
6 
In both cases, the difference between HOI and observed school attendance is statistically 
significant. The penalty (share of access to opportunities allocated in violation of the equality of 
                                                           
6 It is worth noting that decomposition between both years is conducted for an unweighted sample with no information on 
location of the household, given that at the time this paper was completed the information on weights and location of households 
was not available for CWIQ 2010. Subsequent analyses for CWIQ 2007 use population weights. A robustness check of the effect 
of  weights  on  results  shows  that  the  level  of  the  HOI  seems  to  increase  without  weights,  but  that  does  not  affect  main 
conclusions.  20 
 
opportunity principle, see Molinas et al. 2010) is about 4.0 percentage points in 2007 and 4.9 
percentage points in 2010, indicating that over time educational opportunities measured through 
school attendance of children age 6-15 have not become more equally allocated.
7  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Regarding the estimated probabilities of attending school across types of children, for simplicity 
only eight types of children are reported here based on three circumstances: household head‘s 
education, child‘s gender and location of the household in 2007. The remaining circumstances 
are considered in the simulations but are not used to discriminate among groups when reporting 
average results by type. The first four types are opportunity-vulnerable—their estimated 
probability of attending school given their circumstances is below the observed average access 
rate, 63 percent (Table 3). In contrast, the last four types are non-vulnerable as their probabilities 
are above the observed average access rate. The education of the household head seems to be the 
most critical factor in the estimated distribution of opportunities: all vulnerable types have 
parents who have not completed primary education. For the rest of circumstances, vulnerable as 
well as non-vulnerable types include children both in urban and rural households, and both 
female and male children.  
 
                                                           
7 Although not reported here, household head characteristics and wealth are the most important factors explaining the unequal 
distribution  of  this  opportunity.  In  2010,  results  point  to  a  similar  pattern,  though  the  importance  of  child  characteristics 
increases. A decomposition of the estimated change in HOI between 2007 and 2010 indicates that most of the HOI‘s small 
increase over time is due to a scale effect (increased access for all, without regard to equity), accounting for 1.99 percentage 
points,  while  equalization  effects  (greater  equity  in  access)  between  both  years  account  for  -1.29  percentage  points  and 
composition effects (change in the composition of circumstances) account for the remaining 0.1 percentage point. This means 
that  the  observed  improvement  is  mostly  due  to  changes  in  the  coverage  rate  and  not  to  egalitarian  improvements  in  the 
distribution of attendance or in the distribution of circumstances across the population. 21 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2 Opportunity-Benefit Incidence Analysis (Opp-BIA)   
Three patterns of education spending—the distribution of monetized benefits accruing to 
children attending public schools in Liberia per beneficiary (―gross unitary public transfer‖), the 
distribution of private out-of-pocket household spending incurred as a result of attending schools 
per beneficiary (―unitary private spending‖), and the resulting difference between public benefit 
and private contribution towards school attendance, ―net unitary benefit‖, again on a beneficiary 
basis—are now compared (Figure 2). World Bank (2010) reports total resources in the public 
education system of US$ 77.2 million, accruing from three sources: US$12.2 million by the 
government, US$27 million by households and US$38 million by international donors. Gross 
unitary public transfers are obtained by dividing government‘s and donors‘ educational spending 
by level of education among enrolled students: US$ 6.9 per student enrolled in primary 
education and US$ 84.5 per student enrolled in secondary education.  Unitary private spending is 
obtained directly from household‘s reports on their actual spending on children attending school. 
These patterns of average public resources spent per student and households‘ average private 
contributions towards education are compared against the distribution of household wealth
8 and 
the distribution of educational opportunities, proxied by the estimated probability of attending 
school conditional on their circumstances (see Table 1 above). The former generates traditional 
BIA, while the latter an ―Opportunity BIA‖.   
                                                           
8 There is no direct interpretation of the values of the wealth index. The wealth index is constructed with principal factor analysis 
(PCA) of information on assets in the household. The source data are a series of dummies where 1 is assigned if the household 
has  the  asset  (television,  car,  radio,  etc).  We  construct  z-scores  of  the  data  and  project  them  onto  a  new  basis  using  the 
eigenvectors that decompose the covariance of the data. Intuitively, we are using the information of asset ownership to rank 
households according to their ownership of goods, giving more weight to the information that explains the largest part of the 
variance in the asset dummies. 22 
 
Results from both BIA exercises are staggering. Liberian households make private contributions 
towards public education that generally exceed the public transfers implicit in the provision of 
public education (Figure 2a). This is in line with the aggregate contributions towards all 
educational spending reported for that year by World Bank (2010), which at US$ 27 million 
more than double the government‘s US$12.2 million financing. From a distributive point of 
view, unitary private spending towards public education increases by levels of wealth while 
unitary public transfers hardly change among wealth quintiles. This results in a distribution of 
net public benefits that is increasingly negative, showing a progressive distribution for the 
‗wrong reasons‘: progressivity is achieved because of increasing private contributions from 
households as their wealth increases, rather than by increasing public transfers to poorer 
households.   
 
This picture is even more dramatic when considering the distribution of educational 
opportunities (Figure 2b). Once quintiles are computed from the distribution of attending school 
probabilities among children age 6-15, it becomes clear that children in the bottom two 
opportunity quintiles (with an expected probability of attending lower than 52 percent) rarely 
attend school. This leads to a very small average group gross unitary public spending and unitary 
private spending in these two quintiles. Children in the third quintile, with an estimated 
probability of attending school given their circumstances of 52-71 percent, appear to contribute 
slightly more than the previous groups. Households from the top two quintiles of the distribution 
of attending probabilities (71-85 percent and 85-100 percent, respectively) clearly contribute 
privately towards school attendance, more so in the case of the top quintile.  23 
 
As a result, the Opp-BIA shows the same peculiar progressivity caused by an increasing private 
contribution among non-vulnerable households and a very low and uniform public transfer. 
However, the Opp-BIA shows an even more unequal distribution than traditional BIA. It shows, 
in fact, that only those most able to pay for public education are likely to attend a public school. 
Those with a set of circumstances that make them vulnerable are not participating much in the 
distribution of meager public transfers. By including all children age 6-15 in the distribution of 
benefits, either attending or not, the Opp-BIA provides a more comprehensive picture than 
traditional BIA, which only depicts the benefits to those who actually attend school. In doing so, 
the Opp-BIA analysis presents a bleaker picture of educational spending incidence in Liberia 
than traditional BIA.  
[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 
The BIA also provides evidence of the shares of benefits captured by socioeconomic groups. The 
traditional analysis of shares (Figure 3a) indicates that the pattern of public spending on 
education in Liberia is clearly not pro-poor. In fact, it follows a very neutral distribution, almost 
proportional to the share of beneficiaries by quintile (the only exception being a more than 
proportional concentration of benefits in the third quintile of the distribution of wealth). 
Incidence analysis based on opportunities (Figure 3b) shows, once again, a bleaker scenario, in 
which the share of benefits is below the population share for three out of four vulnerable groups 
of children (groups 1, 2 and 4). The opposite occurs for three out of four non-vulnerable groups 
of children, 5, 6 and 8, whose share of benefits exceeds their share of children age 6-15. The 
Opp-BIA confirms that the distribution of benefits is less pro-poor when analyzed against 24 
 
opportunities than wealth levels: children age 6-15 belonging to vulnerable categories represent 
45 percent of the total population of children of that age and receive only 37 percent of public 
benefits. 




5.3 Redistributive Simulations 
Table 4 presents the results of the four simulated scenarios. Simulation 1 has an increase in total 
government transfers by an additional 70 percent equally distributed to all children eligible to 
attending public school. This additional amount is the share of the budget that would be required 
to equalize the current salaries of teachers to regional standards advocated in the Fast Track 
Initiative, Education for All (see World Bank 2010). The simulation increases by 70 percent the 
current public transfer to each child eligible to attend public school.  
 
Simulation 2 represents an increase in transfers for all children eligible to attend public schools 
in the form of fee expenses recovery. In policy terms, the intervention conceived in this scenario 
is a voucher for each child eligible to attend a public school equivalent to the average monetary 
cost of households‘ contributions in the form of implicit fees to the public school (current fees 
are informal or implicit since they are officially eliminated). This does not necessarily imply that 
each specific household would be exactly compensated by the amount of fees paid as reported in 
the CWIQ but by the average fees paid by children attending public school at age 6-15.  25 
 
 
Simulation 3 is an increase in transfers for all kids eligible to attend public school to compensate 
for the current non-fee expenses (such as books and uniforms). This corresponds to giving each 
child in public school a subsidy equivalent to the average monetary cost of non-fee expenses in 
public and private schools.
 9  
 
 Simulation 4 is a pure redistributive scenario, in which all public resources channeled into 
beneficiaries of urban public schools are redistributed to children attending rural public schools 
on a per capita basis.
 10This is not to say that this is a realistic or desirable policy; rather, the 
scenario provides a sense of the redistributive potential that such a ‗draconian‘ intervention 
would have. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
Results in Table 4 report the average probability to attend public school for each group before 
and after the shock, and the respective changes on HOI attributed to the shock.
11 Also, it 
provides an indication of the additional per beneficiary fiscal cost associated with each scenario. 
A first finding is that the overall impact in all four simulations is quite limited in magnitude, 
even when they involve large swings in resources (simulation 4) or large relative increases in 
transfers (simulations 1 to 3). This implies that even when changes are substantial in relative 
                                                           
9 We could have also used the average spending in non-fee expenses only in public school. This would have biased downwards 
the cost of diminishing inequality, since children in public school are likely to spend less than the presumably more appropriate 
amount spent in better-equipped private schools.  
10 Note that we base our exercise on estimates for children in public schools, since it is assumed that the government will not 
assign policies that affect the children already in the private system that might be paying fees to private entities. This assumption 
limits the extent of the policy effect, but seems more reasonable in terms of policy implementation. 
11 Following the recent literature on the HOI, we used the  geometric mean version of the index for the simulations in Table  4. 
The geometric HOI respects the property of sub -group consistence and is not weakly sensitive to inequality as in the linear 
version of the index. 26 
 
terms, they are very small in absolute terms: none produces budgetary increases in excess of 
US$10 million. As a result, no substantive improvement in opportunities in Liberia will occur 
with levels of educational spending as low as these observed.  
 
A second key result is that the single largest increase in HOI comes from simulation 3, that is, 
from reducing non-fee expenses from households. This would eliminate the source of monetary 
contributions for households. This comes at the largest costs as well for the government, at about 
92 percent of the current public budget on education. Since the average cost of non-fee expenses 
is calculated using an estimate of the household average spending in non-fee school items the 
population, we are effectively bringing the spending of children in public schools closer to the 
spending of children in private schools regarding textbooks, uniforms and other school materials. 
Interestingly, the purely redistributive simulation, simulation 4, causes an overall deterioration in 
the HOI, as the reduction in urban household HOI is not fully compensated by the increased HOI 
for rural households (given that many current eligible but non-participating children in rural 
areas will improve their situation as a result of the simulated intervention). 
 
Behind the modest estimated average effects on the distribution of opportunities, there are 
different patterns of winners and losers for each scenario. However, these patterns do not seem to 
cause large compositional effects among the different types of children. In fact, none of the 
groups change their vulnerability status as a consequence of the policy intervention. 
Interestingly, rural groups tend to do better than urban children in all four simulations. In the first 
three simulations, all groups benefit in net terms, but some benefit more than others. The 27 
 
smallest win in simulation 1 is found among urban female children with non-educated heads. In 
simulation 2, the smallest win is found among urban female children with educated heads. In 
simulation 3, urban male children with educated heads win the least. The groups with the largest 
wins are rural male children, both with educated and uneducated heads. Only simulation 4 has 
net winners and net losers: rural male children with non-educated and educated household heads 
and urban male children with non-educated heads, respectively.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper adds to the existing work on equality of opportunities and fiscal policies, linking the 
recently developed HOI to fiscal issues. It does so by including the equality of opportunity angle 
to traditional BIA and by simulating the equity impacts of redistributive interventions on 
opportunities, rather than on traditional welfare outcomes. The empirical analysis is conducted 
for Liberia, a case in which both short-term development and longer-term opportunities 
improvements after a long civil war are paramount policy objectives.  
 
The probability of attending public school in Liberia has improved over time. Household head‘s 
education appears to be very influential in the distribution of children‘s educational 
opportunities. Incidence results indicate that a traditional BIA may not fully pick up the 
staggering incidence of public resources in education. The opportunity BIA substantiates that 
children whose circumstances make them vulnerable are very unlikely to attend school and, as 
such, benefit from any implicit transfer of resources from public education. The main reason 28 
 
appears to be the high private contributions (vis-à-vis public transfers) necessary to attend a 
public school in Liberia.  
 
Simulation results show that draconian redistributive interventions—without sector changes or 
changes in circumstances—may lead only modest improvements in the probability of attending 
school (less than three percentage points) and have little effect on the average vulnerability 
status of children. Results also show that some types of children defined by their circumstances 
would not slip into opportunity vulnerability, while other types are not likely to move out of 
vulnerability following the simulated redistributive interventions. Notwithstanding these results, 
rural children tend to benefit more than urban from all simulations. 
 
Simulation results need be taken cautiously. The analysis is not intended to provide detailed 
normative conclusions. Yet, it highlights the fact that some interventions may have a different 
pattern of winners and losers. These patterns change by intervention, and the costs associated to 
them also vary substantially. The critical take-away message, however, is that at the level of 
public spending on education (US$12.2 million), little can be done to improve substantially 
opportunities among children. In addition, the analysis shows that in spite of large increases in 
spending a number of circumstances act as serious constraints in determining the probability of 
enjoying an opportunity. In this respect, by focusing ex-ante on opportunities rather than 
outcomes, the analysis underscores that the traditional short-term analysis of welfare outputs 
may be complemented with a longer-term discussion addressing how to remove critical obstacles 
to an egalitarian allocation of key public services.  29 
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Where v (π, x) is the value of the objective of individuals in 
type t at quintile π of the effort distribution in type t, if the 
type is allocated x in resources by the policy instrument, with 
X defined as the feasible set of policies.  The solution is the 
policy that maximizes the minimum value of the objective for 






Wage incomes  Equalizing opportunities 
across races in the US at a 
given educational budget 
would entail spending nine 
to 18 times as much on 
blacks as on whites. 
 
Color-blind policies that 
equalize opportunities based 
on parental education alone 
do almost nothing to change 
the distribution of blacks 
across earnings quintiles. 
Roemer et al. 
(2003) 
Determine the 
extent to which 








native ability (IQ 
test of parents 
during youth in 
US, Denmark, 
Sweden and the 
Netherlands) 
Gross pre 




Northern Europe income 
taxation regimes are optimal 
in terms of equal 
opportunities and some even 
tax more than equality of 
opportunity requires. 
 
When individual ability is 
considered, Sweden and 
Denmark still over tax.  
Measurement            













Determine the stochastic dominance of a distribution of 
incomes x conditional on circumstance set s and the 
distribution of incomes conditional to another set s‘:  
 
Where GLF (p) is the value of the generalized Lorenz curve at 
p for the distribution F (. │p) and SSD a second-order 
dominance test.  
 
Also, the authors define the Gini Opportunity Index,  
 
 
Where μ denotes the mean of the income distribution, G the 












Among nine OECD 
countries, the hypothesis of 
equal opportunities of 
household incomes cannot 
be rejected only in Sweden. 
 
A correlation between GO 
and G of 0.67. Yet at a 
similar G of incomes 
between France and 
Netherlands, Netherlands is 
much more opportunity-















Compute a new opportunity inequality index  
 




Ec(Y│o)= Σs Ec(Y│o,s) pc(s│o) 
 
 
C indicates the country of analysis, o accounts for social 
origin, s is the intermediary outcome (son‘s social position), 
p(s/o) is the conditional probability of reaching the social 
position s given the social origin o, and E( ) the income 
expectation conditional of income.   
 
Social origins by 
parental 
education and 




Ghana has the lowest 
income inequality among 
individuals of different 
social origins, while 
Madagascar the highest. 
Ivory Coast, Guinea and 
Uganda fall in between but 
cannot be ranked 
unambiguously. 








Compute the HOI defined as: 
 
HOI= C – P 
 
Where C is the observed coverage for the opportunity and P is 
the penalty of inequality of opportunity, computed as: 
 
      
 
   
         
 
Where N is total population, Mk is the number of people with 
access to a good or service within vulnerable circumstance 
group k, and      is the number of people in that group needed 









presence of both 
parents, gender 
of the child, 




















Aggregated HOI for Latin 
American countries as a 
whole has increased during 
the last 15 years but there 
are many disparities among 




parental education, matter a 
lot in explaining regional 
and country-specific 
distribution of opportunities.  
 
Only a small proportion of 
HOI improvement over time 
is due to fairer access of 
services. Most of the 
improvement comes from 
changes in the distribution 
of circumstances (partially 
associated to migration). 
 
Source: Authors. 33 
 
Appendix 2: HOI, Op-BIA and Ex-ante Simulation of Fiscal Policies on Education 






Measure the equality 
of the opportunity for 
school attendance 
among children 6-15 
in Liberia. 
HOI= C – P 
 
      
 
   
          
The HOI is a good 
proxy for an equity-
sensitive coverage rate. 
Circumstances used are 
relevant key drivers of 
inequity. A direct 
property of the HOI is 
that missing a relevant 
circumstance does not 
overwhelm the use of 
other circumstances: the 
estimated HOI is an 




2007 and 2010 
 
Decomposition  of 
key  drivers  for 
2010  results  and 
between 2007 and 
2010  are 
performed.  
Opp-BIA  Assess the distribution 
of public resources 
among the distribution 
of opportunities and 
compare that 
allocation of resources 
with the distribution 
of those resources 
along wealth. 
ɸ(S,w) vs.  ɸ(S,Opp) 
 
where ɸ(  ) is the distribution of public spending S (net 
of private contributions), across quintiles of wealth, w, 
and opportunities, Opp.  
There is no relevant 
heterogeneity of public 
spending across groups; 
we can rely on a 
constant national unitary 
benefit. 




level of education 
but not region, so 
the unitary benefit 
is a national 




Attribute changes in 
estimated HOI due to 
changes in public 
spending on 
education. 
Step 1: Computing opportunities with spending 
 
[2] Estimate a new logit for school attendance including 
now as circumstance gross unitary benefit associated to 
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[3] Obtain the predicted probabilities of the logit for 




 [4] Estimate the HOI (as indicated above) prior to the 
shock 
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Step 1: Selected 
controls are the critical 
circumstances 
determining school 





Step 2: Public spending 
is a valid circumstance, 




Step 3: The same 
coefficients of step 1 
can be used to predict 
step 2: no change in 
reduced form 










resources (a pure 
income or demand 
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Step 2: Policy Shock 
[5] Recalculate the probability for each group of 
children after the amount of benefits and/or identity of 
beneficiaries is changed according to each simulated 
scenario: 
   (i) Increase in spending for all eligible children 
  (ii) Increase in spending towards fee expenses  
 (iii) Increase in spending towards non-fee expenses 
 (iv) Increase in spending targeted to rural children who 
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[5] Estimate the probabilities after the shock and the 





           Where sim= i… iv 
 
          and:  
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 Step 3: Attribution 
relationships. No 
behavioral changes 
assumed. The extra 
spending will be used 
towards education. 
 
Step 4: No interaction 
between spending and 
other circumstances. 
Other circumstances 
remain constant as we 
change the unitary 
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[6] The differences in the prior and post-shock 
probabilities to attend school and HOI are attributed to 
the policy shock 
^ ^
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Appendix 3: Logit Estimates for Public School Attendance Children Age 6-15 
Independent Variables  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Gender (male=1)  0.12  0.08 
Location (urban=1)  -0.68  0.11** 
Household head gender (female =1)  -0.35  0.11** 
Children age  0.09  0.02** 
Years of education of household head   0.05  0.01** 
Age of household head   0.01  0.00 
Number of children in household (15 or under)  0.04  0.02 
Presence of elder (64+) in household (yes=1)  -0.01  0.14 
Parents not in the household (if one or both not 
present =1)  -0.41  0.11** 
Orphan (one or both parents deceased, =1)  -0.76  0.14** 
Wealth quintile 2  0.04  0.12 
Wealth quintile 3  0.30  0.13* 
Wealth quintile 4  0.21  0.13 
Wealth quintile 5  0.50  0.15** 
North Western Region  -0.37  0.15** 
North Central Region  0.71  0.20** 
South Central  -0.63  0.14** 
South Eastern (River Cess,Grand Gedeh, Sinoe)  -0.04  0.15 
South Eastern (River G, Maryland, Grand Kru)  0.45  0.16** 
Gross public transfers received  0.06  0.01** 
Constant  -0.99  0.28** 
n: 5,562                      R
2 = 0.19 
   










Table 1: Educational Opportunities in Liberia: Incidence of Educational Opportunities 
among Liberian Children (%) 




Attending school (6-11years)  60.8  60.1 
Attending school (12-15years)  66.7  73.8 
Finish 6th grade (13-15)  17.7  11.7 
Started primary on time (6-7)  16.1  10.2 
 
Source: Authors‘ estimates from LISGIS (2007, 2008, 2010). Note: The respective values of these 




Table 2: Relevant Circumstances for Educational Opportunities in Liberia, 2007-2010 (percent of 
individuals with those circumstances) 
 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CHILDREN UNDER 16 
YRS  DHS 2007  CWIQ 2007  CWIQ 2010 
Urban  36.0  28.9  - 
Gender of the child  50.9  51.1  51.6 
Gender of the head  68.8  74.7  77.8 
Age of the head  43.9  43.1  43.7 
Education of the head  5.3  5.6  5.5 
Single parent  28.7  28.3  20.9 
Number of children  3.9  3.6  3.768 
Region  6  6  - 
Mother alive  97.4  97.2  97.5 
Father alive  95.0  93.2  95.2 




Table 3: The Distribution of Educational Opportunities in Liberia 2007 
Type ID 
Description 




1  Rural, female child, head with no primary  53.8 
2  Rural, male child, head with no primary  55.4 
3  Urban, female child, head with no primary  54.8 
4  Urban, male child, head with no primary  55.4 
5  Rural, female child, head with primary  67.5 
6  Rural, male child, head with primary  67.5 
7  Urban, female child, head with primary  74.8 
8  Urban, male child, head with primary  72.9 
Source: Authors‘ estimates from LISGIS (2008)  
  
Table 4: Simulation Results  
 
Baseline  
(pre-shock)  Sim 1  Sim 2  Sim 3  Sim 4 
Probability of attending 
school (%)  63.0  65.0  65.0  67.0  63.5 
Estimated HOI(as%)  57  61  59.6  61.4  56.5 





Urban: - $11.4 
b 
Rural:    $  3.0 
b 
increase  in  public 
education spending (%) 
c  n.a.  70.0  48.0  92.1  0.0 
Group  probability  of 
attending school  (%):            
Urban children  69.0  70.0  70.0  70.0  67.2 
Rural children  60.0  63.0  63.0  65.0  61.7 
Type 1   53.9  55.9  56.6  58.9  55.4 
Type 2  55.4  57.7  58.3  60.6  57.0 
Type 3  54.8  55.6  56.0  57.1  53.6 
Type 4  55.4  56.7  56.9  58.1  53.9 
Type 5  67.5  70.2  70.1  72.1  68.9 
Type 6  67.5  70.2  70.3  72.6  69.1 
Type 7  74.9  75.9  75.7  76.4  73.9 
Type 8  73.0  75.1  74.0  74.8  71.3 
Source: Authors‘ estimates from LISGIS (2008) 
Notes: 
a Per beneficiary unitary gross spending on education. 
b Additional per beneficiary spending on education. 
c 
% increase over total public spending on education, that is, over US$12.2 million.  39 
 
Figure 1: HOI 2007 and 2010 in Liberia 
 

















































HOI Attendance(6-15) 2007 HOI Attendance(6-15) 2010
Confidence Interval Coverage
Source : Authors ' calculation with CWIQ 2007 - 2010
Educational Opportunities40 
 
Figure 2a BIA of Education Spending 
 
Quintiles of wealth: Q1: (-1.80 to -0.60); Q2: (-0.60 -0.06); Q3: (-0.06 to 0.38); Q4: (0.38 to 1.09); Q5: 
(1.10 to 9.78).     
                                    
Figure 2b: Opp-BIA of Education Spending 
 
Quintiles of opportunities (proxied by quintiles of school attendance probability): Q1: (0 to 0.45); Q2: (0.45 to 0.52); 
Q3: (0.52 to 0.71); Q4: (0.71 to 0.85); Q5: (0.85 to 1) 
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Spending by quintile of probability41 
 
 
Figure 3a: Share of Benefits                                   Figure 3b: Share of Benefits 
by Wealth Group                                              by Circumstance Group 
  
Source: Authors‘ estimates from LISGIS (2008) 
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